When there is signi…cant overlap in potential partner airlines' route networks, policymakers have expressed concern that an alliance between such airlines may facilitate collusion on price and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. The contribution of our paper is to put together a structural econometric model that is able to explicitly disentangle the demand and supply e¤ects associated with an alliance between such airlines. The estimates from our structural econometric model do identify demand-increasing e¤ects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance, but statistically reject collusive behavior between the partners.
Introduction
Policymakers have expressed skepticism when reviewing airlines' application to form a codeshare alliance in the event that such an alliance involves potential partners that have signi…cant overlap in their route networks. The heart of the concern is that these potential partners are direct competitors in the segments of their networks that overlap, and an alliance between them, which often requires broad discussions between partners to make their interline 1 service seamless, could facilitate collusion on prices and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. Before ultimately approving the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance, which was formed in June 2003, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) expressed these concerns. 2 The DOT's review of this proposed alliance points out that the three airlines' service overlap in 3,214 markets accounting for approximately 58 million annual passengers, which is in contrast to the next largest alliance between United Airlines and US Airways with overlapping service in only 543 markets accounting Using a reduced-form econometric model similar to that in Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004), Gayle (2008) has shed some light on price e¤ects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance. In particular, Gayle (2008) …nds that the alliance is associated with a marginal price increase, which by itself points to possible collusive e¤ects. But a marginal price increase is also consistent with increased demand and there is good reason to believe that an alliance has a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. For example, passengers that are members of an airline's frequent- ‡yer program may cumulatively earn and redeem frequent- ‡yer miles across any partner in the alliance. The new opportunities for passengers to earn and redeem miles will likely increase demand for the alliance partners' products. In the case of enhancements to international frequent- ‡yer partnerships, Lederman (2007) provides reduced-form econometric evidence suggesting that enhancements to international frequent- ‡yer partnerships are associated with increases in domestic airline demand.
To better understand the market e¤ects associated with an alliance, both from the demand and supply sides of a market, it is important to go beyond the reduced-form analyses that currently exist in the literature. As such, the main contribution of our present paper is to specify and estimate a structural econometric model that allows us to disentangle demand changes from possible changes in airline pricing behavior that are associated with a codeshare alliance. The empirical separation of demand changes from airline pricing behavior changes allows us to: (1) statistically test whether a codeshare alliance is associated with a demand-increasing e¤ect; and (2) statistically test whether a codeshare alliance is associated with collusive pricing behavior in the partners' overlapping markets, as feared by policymakers.
Our key …ndings are as follows: First, the econometric estimates for the air travel demand equation suggest that the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance has a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. Importantly, the demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that the partners have a substantial joint passenger share (greater than 49%) prior to implementation of the alliance. Since a relatively larger proportion of passengers in a market are more likely to have frequent- ‡yer membership with at least one of the three carriers in markets that the carriers jointly dominate prior to the alliance, this …nding is consistent with the argument that these frequent- ‡yer passengers will increase their demand for the alliance partners' products given that the alliance creates new opportunities for passengers to accumulate and redeem frequent- ‡yer points across partner carriers.
Second, a statistical non-nested test applied to air travel supply model selection suggests that Bertrand Nash pricing behavior, rather than collusive pricing behavior, between the three airlines better …t the data in markets where the three airlines codeshare together. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to explicitly test and statistically reject that collusive pricing behavior is associated with a codeshare alliance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we make some key de…nitions which build the foundation for important issues we subsequently model, analyze, and discuss. In section 3 we discuss characteristics of our data. We present the structural econometric model in section 4, while estimation strategy is discussed in section 5. Results are presented and discussed in section 6. Concluding remarks are o¤ered in section 7.
De…nitions
A market is de…ned as directional round-trip air travel between an origin and a destination airport during a particular period. The assumption that markets are directional implies that a roundtrip air travel from Atlanta to Detroit is a distinct market than round-trip air travel from Detroit to Atlanta. Furthermore, this directional assumption allows for the possibility that origin city characteristics may in ‡uence market demand [see Gayle (2007a Gayle ( , 2007b Gayle ( , 2013 , Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) ].
A ‡ight itinerary is de…ned as a speci…c sequence of airport stops in traveling from the origin to destination airport. An air travel product is de…ned as a unique combination of airline(s) and ‡ight itinerary. Following Ito and Lee (2007) , a pure online product means that the same airline markets and operates all segments of a round-trip. For example, three separate pure online products are:
(1) a non-stop round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed and operated by Delta Air Lines;
(2) a round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit with one stop in Minneapolis marketed and operated by Delta Air Lines; and (3) a non-stop round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed and operated by Northwest Air Lines. Note that all three products are in the same market -Atlanta to Detroit.
A codeshare agreement e¤ectively allows one carrier (called the "ticketing carrier " or "marketing carrier ") to sell seats on its partners' plane as if these seats are owned by the carrier selling the seats. The carrier whose plane that actually transports the passenger is referred to as the "operating carrier ". For example, Northwest may sell tickets for a subset of seats on a Delta operated ‡ight between Atlanta and Detroit as if the plane were owned by Northwest. Thus, a passenger that uses a codeshare itinerary may have bought the round-trip ticket from Northwest, but actually ‡ies on a plane operated by Delta.
The literature on domestic airline alliances has identi…ed two main types of codeshare itineraries:
(1) traditional codeshare; and (2) virtual codeshare. 3 Traditional codeshare itineraries combine interline operating services of partner carriers on a given route, where one of these operating carriers is the sole ticketing carrier for the entire trip. An example of a traditional codeshare product is a trip from Atlanta to Detroit with one stop in Minneapolis, where the Atlanta to Minneapolis segment of the trip is operated by Delta, the Minneapolis to Detroit segment of the trip is operated by Northwest, but the ticket for the entire trip is marketed by Northwest. Brueckner and Whalen (2000) , Brueckner (2003) , Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2008) …nd evidence that traditional codesharing tends to lower rather than raise prices. An often cited reason for this price-decreasing e¤ect of traditional codesharing is that this type of codesharing eliminates double markup that would otherwise persist when carriers are una¢liated. 4 Owing to the existing robust empirical evidence of a price-decreasing e¤ect associated with traditional codesharing, this type of codesharing is not the focus of our present analysis. The type of codesharing we focus on in this research is referred to as virtual codeshare. A passenger using a virtual codeshare itinerary remains on a single operating carrier's plane(s) for the entire round-trip, but the ticket for the trip was marketed and sold by a partner ticketing carrier. Thus a key distinction between virtual codeshare and traditional codeshare is that traditional codeshare requires the passenger to travel on di¤erent operating carriers' planes (interline air travel) on a multi-segment route, while virtual codeshare does not involve interline air travel even when the passenger changes planes on a multi-segment route. We focus on virtual codesharing because Gayle (2008) …nds that this is the only type of codesharing that is associated with price increases. Figure 1 gives an example where two airlines' route networks overlap and the airlines may virtual codeshare together in the origin-destination market. The …gure shows that Northwest and Delta both operate non-stop ‡ights in the Atlanta to Detroit market. If they virtual codeshare together in this market, then a subset of the passengers on the Delta plane would have bought their tickets from Northwest, while a subset of the passengers on the Northwest plane would have bought their tickets from Delta.
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Figure 1: Route Network Diagram
Delta plane with some Northwestticketed passengers. Figure 2 shows an alternate situation in which the airlines' route networks may overlap. In 
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Figure 2: Modified Route Network Diagram
Delta plane with some Northwestticketed passengers.
In Figure 2 it might seem counter-intuitive that a passenger would choose a one-stop itinerary even though a non-stop ‡ight between the origin and destination is available. However, passengers often choose less convenient routes ( ‡ight itineraries that require intermediate stops) to get from their origin to destination when such alternate routing is competitively priced. In other words, within reasonable bounds, some passengers are willing to trade-o¤ travel itinerary convenience for a lower price. Figure 2 can also be used to illustrate a situation in which virtual codesharing is likely to have a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. In the event that Northwest and Delta do not have a codeshare alliance, Northwest can only o¤er its Atlanta-based customers (some of whom may be members of Northwest's frequent- ‡yer program) a non-stop ‡ight to Detroit. However, an alliance with Delta allows Northwest to o¤er its Atlanta-based customers both a non-stop ‡ight on its own plane and a one-stop virtual codeshared itinerary operated solely by Delta. While passengers in Atlanta already had the option, prior to an alliance, to purchase either a pure online one-stop itinerary from Delta or a pure online non-stop ‡ight from Northwest, Northwest's frequent- ‡yers could not accumulate frequent- ‡yer miles on the Delta operated ‡ights. Thus, the alliance created a new opportunity for Northwest frequent- ‡yers to accumulate miles on a Delta operated one-stop itinerary. Similarly, Delta frequent- ‡yers that would like to travel on the non-stop Northwest ‡ight also have a new opportunity to accumulate frequent- ‡yer miles on the Northwest operated ‡ight.
The new opportunity for passengers to accumulate frequent- ‡yer miles across partner carriers is one reason we expect a demand-increasing e¤ect to be associated with a codeshare alliance. Our econometric model is designed to isolate and test for this potential demand-increasing e¤ect. Figure 2 is also useful to illustrate the main concern the DOT expressed in its review of the proposed alliance between Delta, Continental and Northwest. Since Delta and Northwest were competitors in the market shown in Figure 2 , the DOT was concerned that forming an alliance would reduce the amount of competition between the two airlines. The econometric model we present below is designed to statistically test if collusive pricing behavior, rather than Bertrand Nash pricing behavior, between the three airlines better …t the data in markets that the three airlines virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period.
Data
Data are drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10% random sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. DB1B is a database that is maintained and published by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Among other things, the database includes: (1) number of passengers that choose a given ‡ight itinerary; (2) the fares of these itineraries; (3) the speci…c sequence of airport stops that each itinerary uses in getting passengers from the origin to destination city; (4) the carrier(s) that marketed and sold the travel ticket (ticketing carriers), and the carrier(s) that passengers actually ‡y on for their trip (operating carriers); and (5) the distance ‡own on each itinerary in a directional market. The distance associated with each itinerary in a market may di¤er since each itinerary may use di¤erent connecting airports in transporting passengers from the origin to destination city.
Unfortunately, the DB1B database does not include passenger-speci…c information. For example, relevant passenger-speci…c information that we do not have are: (1) whether or not a passenger has frequent- ‡yer membership with an airline; (2) the speci…c day of week of the travel; (3) the length of time in advance of travel that the passenger purchased the ticket; and (4) purpose of trip -leisure versus business. Therefore, we will have to rely on the econometric model's ability to tease out consumer choice behavior patterns from aggregated ticket purchase data. In addition, the database does not contain certain useful measures of travel itinerary convenience such as layover times or departure times. Notwithstanding these de…ciencies in the data, we are able to construct useful measures of itinerary convenience from the available information in the data, which we discuss below.
The data we use link each product to a directional market rather than a mere non-stop route or segment of a market. For this research, we focus on U.S. domestic ‡ights o¤ered and operated by U.S. carriers in the fourth quarters of 2002 (pre-alliance) and 2003 (post-alliance). 5 We arrive at the …nal sample used for estimation by applying a few …lters to the original data set. First, itineraries with price less than $100 are excluded due to the high probability that these may be coding errors or passengers redeeming frequent- ‡yer miles to obtain a discounted fare. Second, itineraries with an inordinate number of intermediate stops (more than two) were dropped. Third, we focus on pure online and virtual codeshare products as de…ned previously.
Fourth, following the standard practice for empirical analyses of airline codesharing, we recode 5 Collecting data from the same quarter in both years will eliminate potential seasonal e¤ects in demand. regional feeder carriers to have their major carrier codes. In the absence of such recoding of feeder carriers, products that only include a major carrier and its associated regional feeder carrier(s) may mistakenly be counted as codeshare products since the operating and ticketing carrier codes would di¤er. 6 Based on our previously stated research objectives, we focus on origin-destination markets in which at least two of the three airlines (Delta, Continental and Northwest) o¤ered competing pure online products both in the pre and post-alliance periods. In other words, the three carriers' networks overlap in all of the markets that remain in our …nal sample. In addition, similar to Berry (1992) and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others, we focus on airports in the largest 50 U.S. cities as measured by city population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 1 reports a list of the cities and airports included in our sample. Gayle (2007a) and collapsed the data by averaging the price and aggregating the number of passengers purchasing products as de…ned by unique itinerary-airline(s) combination. 7 In other words, before the data are collapsed, there are several observations of a given itinerary-airline(s) combination that are distinguished by prices paid and number of passengers paying each of those prices. The …nal sample has 22,485 products contained in 1,170 origin-destination markets that span the pre and post-alliance periods.
Variables that we gathered and constructed from the database include: "Price", "Hub", "Stops", "Inconvenient", "Virtual", "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier Presence at Destination".
These variables are the observable product characteristics. "Price" is the average price paid by passengers who chose the speci…c itinerary-airline(s) combination. "Hub" is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the origin airport is a hub for the ticketing carrier. "Stops" is a variable that counts the number of intermediate stops associated with each product. For example, in the case of products that use non-stop ‡ight itineraries, "Stops" takes the value zero. "Inconvenient" is the ratio of itinerary distance to the non-stop distance between origin and destination airports. The presumption is that an itinerary is less convenient the further its "Inconvenient" measure is from 1. "Virtual" is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the product is virtual codeshared. Both the "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier Presence at Destination" variables are airline-speci…c and vary across markets for each airline. "Carrier Presence at Origin" measures the number of di¤erent cities that an airline has non-stop ‡ights from going into the origin city of the market, while "Carrier Presence at Destination" measures the number of di¤erent cities that the airline serves using non-stop ‡ights from the destination city of the market. We leave discussing the rationale for using each of these variables until the results section since the main task now is to provide descriptive information on the data.
As in Berry and Jia (2010) and Berry, Carnal and Spiller (2006), we measure a market's size (subsequently denoted by M ) by the geometric mean of population sizes across the origin and destination cities of the market. An air travel product's quantity sold (subsequently denoted by q j ) is the total number of passengers that purchase each speci…c itinerary-airline(s) combination.
Therefore, a product's observed market share (subsequently denoted by upper case letter S j ) is computed as quantity of the product sold divided by our measure of market size, i.e. S j = q j M . 8 How we use information on each product's observed market share will become clear after the econometric model and estimation procedure are discussed. Table 2 provides a list of the airlines in the sample according to type of products the airlines are involved in. Table 3 reports sample summary statistics of the variables. Notes: Note that feeder carriers such as Chautauqua Airlines are not listed as involved in codeshare products. This is because we assign these carriers their major carrier codes (effectively not making a distinction between feeder and major carriers) for products where feeder carriers operate segment(s) of the trip but the ticketing carrier is the major carrier. However, the feeder carriers do offer pure online products, which is why they show up in the column labeled "Airlines involved in Pure Online Products". In the data section of the text we provide discussion on the rationale for assigning feeder carriers their major carrier code prior to identifying codeshare products. 
Preliminary Descriptive Analysis
Following many event studies [for example see Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993) ], we begin by using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to get a sense of before and after relative changes in key variables of interest. At this point only descriptive evidence is being developed on the key variables. A more careful analysis of the relevant issues is laid out across subsequent sections of the paper.
In our study the relevant event is implementation of the codeshare alliance. Therefore, the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach seeks to identify e¤ects associated with implementation of the codeshare alliance based on the extent to which variables of interest change before and after implementation of the codeshare alliance across markets that should be impacted by the alliance ("treatment" markets) versus markets that should not be impacted by the alliance ("control" markets). Our treatment markets are origin-destination markets in which Delta, Continental and
Northwest codeshare together during the post-alliance period, while our control markets are origindestination markets that the three airlines compete in but do not codeshare together during the post-alliance period. Among the 1,170 origin-destination markets in the data set, the three airlines virtual codeshare together in 852 of the markets, and therefore compete but did not virtual codeshare together in 318 of the markets.
A variable of interest that we apply the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to is the three airlines' average price. Speci…cally, before and after relative change in Delta, Continental and Northwest average price is computed by: represents Delta, Continental and Northwest average price during the pre-alliance period in origindestination markets that they eventually codeshare together in during the post-alliance period;
DCN _price
Codeshare_mkt post alli period represents the three airlines average price during the post-alliance period in origin-destination markets that they codeshare together during the post-alliance period; DCN _price N on Codeshare_mkt post alli period represents the three airlines average price during the post-alliance period in origin-destination markets that they compete in but do not codeshare together during the post-alliance period; while DCN _price N on Codeshare_mkt pre alli period represents the three airlines average price during the pre-alliance period in origin-destination markets that they compete in but do not codeshare together during the post-alliance period.
Analogous to equation (1), we specify before and after relative changes in the three airlines' joint passenger tra¢c and joint passenger share as follows: The before and after relative change in the three airlines' average price, DCN _price, is 0.0179. One way to interpret this before and after relative price change is that changes in the three airlines' average price leave average price 1.79% higher in their codeshare markets relative to their non-codeshare markets. Before and after relative change in the three airlines total passenger tra¢c, DCN _total_pass, is -0.018. Therefore, before and after changes in the three airlines' passenger tra¢c leave their passenger tra¢c 1.8% lower in their codeshare markets relative to their non-codeshare markets. The direction of the relative price and passenger tra¢c changes suggest that collusive e¤ects could be associated with virtual codesharing between the three airlines in their overlapping markets.
Before and after relative change in the three airlines joint passenger share, DCN _pass_share, is 0.019. Therefore, changes in the three airlines' joint passenger share leave their joint passenger share 1.9% higher in their codeshare markets relative to their non-codeshare markets. So even though the partner airlines' passenger tra¢c declined in their codeshare markets relative to their non-codeshare markets, the partners end up making relative gains in passenger share in their codeshare markets since other airlines' passengers tra¢c fell by more in these markets. This result suggest that there could be a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with virtual codesharing, which in this case resulted in increase passenger share via slower decline in passenger tra¢c.
It must be noted that the di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis captured by equations (1), (2) and (3), has caveats and provide only rough estimates of the e¤ects associated with virtual codesharing between the three airlines. For example, these di¤erence-in-di¤erences computations do not control for persistent demand or cost conditions/shocks that may di¤er across codeshare versus non-codeshare markets. In evaluating the market e¤ects associated with virtual codesharing between the three airlines, the formal econometric model presented below, while not perfect, will do a better job at controlling for potential di¤erences in demand and cost conditions across codeshare versus non-codeshare markets.
Last, it is also useful to get a sense of exogenous characteristics of origin-destination markets that may in ‡uence the three airlines' choice of markets in which to virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period. For this descriptive analysis we rely on a reduced-form logit regression model that uses exogenous market characteristics to explain the three alliance partners' codeshare versus non-codeshare markets. The variable being explained by the logit regression is denoted, Codeshare_mkt, which is a zero-one indicator variable that only takes the value 1 if the three alliance partners virtual codeshare together in the origin-destination market during the postalliance period. Results from this logit regression are reported in Table 4 . The unit of observation for data used in the regression is origin-destination level. Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Model is estimated with market origin dummies and market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the table.
In addition to observed market characteristics such as market size and nonstop ‡ight distance, the regression in Table 4 also controls for unobserved (to the researchers) market endpoint characteristics using a set of dummy variables for origin …xed e¤ects and destination …xed e¤ects. Due to economy of presentation purposes, the coe¢cient estimates on these dummy variables are not reported in the table. The coe¢cient estimates on M arket Size and (M arket Size) 2 suggest that markets with mean endpoint population greater than 4,033,400 people 9 are more likely to be codeshare markets. Also, the coe¢cient estimates on M arket N onstop F light Distance and (M arket N onstop F light Distance) 2 suggest that the probability of a market being a codeshare market increases monotonically with nonstop ‡ight distance between the origin and destination.
There is evidence that the regressors jointly do a good job in explaining the Codeshare_mkt variable. For example, the Pseudo R 2 of the logit regression is 0.4752, suggesting that almost 50% of the variation in Codeshare_mkt is jointly explained by the regressors. Second, the …tted values of the dependent variable from the logit regression, i.e. Codeshare_mkt_hat =Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1), has a 0.717 correlation with Codeshare_mkt. 9 This population threshold is computed using the coe¢cient estimates on M arket Size and (M arket Size) 2 . Speci…cally, the population threshold is computed by: 10; 000; 000 52:41 2 64:97 .
The Model
We proceed by …rst describing the demand-side of the model. The supply-side is then laid out, which is where we model competitive interactions between airlines. 10 
Demand
In the spirit of Peters (2006) demand is modeled using a discrete choice framework. Speci…cally, we use a nested logit model. 11 Potential passenger i in market l during time period faces a choice between J l + 1 alternatives.
There are J l + 1 alternatives because we allow passengers the option (j = 0, the outside good) not to choose either one of the J l di¤erentiated air travel products considered in the empirical model.
Products in a market are assumed to be organized into G + 1 exhaustive mutually exclusive groups/nests, g = 0; 1; :::; G, in which the outside good, j = 0, is assumed to be the only member of group 0. A group or nest here refers to the set of products o¤ered by an airline within a market.
We explore alternate nesting structures in an appendix available upon request.
A passenger solves the following optimization problem:
where U ij l is the level of utility passenger i will obtain if product j is chosen, while j l is the mean level of utility across passengers that consume product j. j l is a function of the characteristics of product j, which we subsequently describe. i lg is a random component of utility that is common to all products in group g, whereas the random term " ij l is speci…c to product j and is assumed to have an extreme value distribution. The parameter lies between 0 and 1, and measures the correlation of the consumers' utility across products belonging to the same group. Since products 1 0 Armantier and Richard (2008) also use a structural econometric model to examine a codeshare alliance. However, a fundamental di¤erence between our model and the model in Armantier and Richard (2008) is that we model both demand and supply aspects of codesharing, while Armantier and Richard (2008) only model the demand side. This crucial methodological di¤erence a¤ords us the advantage of being able to separately identify demand and supply e¤ects of codesharing, which further allows us to more meticulously examine short-run market e¤ects within a market equilibrium framework. 1 1 We concede that a nested logit model is not as ‡exible and therefore less desirable compared to a random coe¢cients logit model. However, it is well-known that the random coe¢cients model is more computationally demanding to estimate relative to the nested logit model. As we discuss further in the results section, our nested logit demand model provides elasticity estimates that are comparable to much of the literature, including papers that use a random coe¢cients logit speci…cation. As such, we decide to go with the less computationally intensive nested logit model. For checks of robustness of qualitative results we explore alternate nesting structures, as further discussed in an appendix available upon request. are grouped by airlines, can also be thought of as measuring the correlation of the consumers' utility across products o¤ered by a given airline. As approaches 1, the correlation of preferences among products o¤ered by the same airline within a market increases. Conversely, as decreases, the correlation of preferences for products o¤ered by the same airline within a market decreases.
The rationale for the product grouping structure above is to capture the possibility that passengers view an airline's products as closer substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability of these products across airlines [Gayle (2007b) ]. One reason why this could be the case is that a passenger may be heavily invested (accumulated miles ‡own) in a given airline's frequent- ‡yer program and therefore, on the margin, would prefer to choose among alternate ‡ights o¤ered by this airline in order to build up accumulated miles towards the required threshold necessary for a discounted trip. Second, some consumers may just have a strong brand-loyalty to a given airline based on past experience. In any event, since is a parameter we estimate, the data will reveal whether or not a su¢cient number of passengers are brand-loyal to render > 0.
The mean level of utility obtained across the population of consumers that consume product j is given by: It is likely that there exists several non-price characteristics that are responsible for passengers' choice of one product over others, where these non-price characteristics are observed by passengers and airlines but not by us the researchers given limitations of the data available. This is the rationale for including j l in the demand model, i.e., the inclusion of j l e¤ectively acknowledges that there will be passenger choice behavior outcomes observed in the data that cannot be fully explained by the measured product characteristics in the data. 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , and 6 are taste parameters to be estimated. 0 captures any persistent di¤erence in mean utility for non-Delta/Continental/Northwest products across markets in which the three airlines eventually virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they compete but do not codeshare together. Likewise, 1 captures any persistent di¤erence in mean utility for the three airlines' products across markets in which the three carriers eventually virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they compete but do not codeshare together. We therefore control for any persistent systematic di¤erence across the three airlines' codeshare versus noncodeshare markets that may a¤ect demand. In other words, 5 > 0 implies that virtual codesharing has a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it, which is one of the main hypotheses we want to test. Last, 6 captures whether or not the demand e¤ect of virtual codesharing depends on the size of the partner airlines' pre-alliance joint passenger share in a market that they eventually begin to codeshare in.
As we previously discussed, frequent- ‡yer membership with any one of the three carriers suddenly becomes more valuable with implementation of the codeshare alliance, since the alliance allows frequent- ‡yer members of any one of the three carriers to accumulate and redeem frequent- ‡yer points across any of the three partner carriers. The larger is the pre-alliance joint passenger share of Delta, Continental and Northwest in an origin-destination market, then we should expect a larger proportion of consumers in the market to have frequent- ‡yer membership with at least one of the three airlines. If this argument holds true, then we should expect 6 > 0.
The discussion above reveals that a key component of our demand speci…cation that allows us to identify demand e¤ects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance ( 5 and 6 ), is that equation (5) e¤ectively compares consumers' choice behavior before and after implementation of the alliance in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together ("treatment" markets) versus markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together ("control" markets). A reasonable criticism to raise at this point is that Codeshare_mkt in equation (5) is not strictly exogenous since airlines choose the markets in which to codeshare. The reader will subsequently observe that we do account for the possible endogeneity of Codeshare_mkt by replacing this variable with the estimated Pr ob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) obtained from the previously discussed logit regression in Table 4 . Therefore, the logit regression in Table 4 serves as one …rst-stage reduced-form regression that is used to account for possible endogeneity when estimating the structural demand model.
Finally, the demand for product j is given by,
where M is a measure of market size, which we assume to be the geometric mean of population sizes across the origin and destination cities of the market, s j ( ) is the predicted product share function based on the nested logit model, 12 x and p are vectors of observed non-price product characteristics and price, respectively, is a vector of unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics, and d = ( ; ; ; ) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. We dropped the market and time subscripts (l and ) only to avoid a clutter of notation. 1 2 The well-known formula for the predicted share function in the case of the nested logit model is:
where j is the previously discussed mean level of utility obtained from consuming product j, ) , and Gg is the set of products in group g.
Supply
What is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works is that the ticketing carrier markets and sets the …nal price for the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for operating services provided. Details on compensation mechanisms actually used by partner airlines are not usually made known to the public and may even vary across partnerships. Therefore, we face the challenge of coming up with a modeling approach that captures our basic understanding of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing too much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts. We concede that the following is possibly a simplistic approximation of the actual contracting used by partners to compensate each other for services needed to provide a codeshare product.
One way to proceed, as pointed out in Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013) , is to think of a codeshare agreement as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners (w; ), where w is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the passenger, while represents a potential lump sum transfer between partners that determines how the joint surplus is distributed. As we develop the supply-side of the model further, it will become clear that only the level of w a¤ects equilibrium …nal product prices. Since for the purposes of this paper we are not concerned how the surplus is distributed between partners through the lump sum transfer , we do not attempt to derive an equilibrium value of . 13 Assume that the …nal price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential pricesetting game. In the …rst stage of the sequential process, the operating carrier sets the price for transporting a passenger, w, and privately makes it known to its partner ticketing carrier. In the second stage, conditional on the agreed upon price w for services supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the …nal round-trip price p for the codeshare product. The …nal subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers.
Let r = 1; :::; R index competing ticketing carriers in a market and let f = 1; :::; F index the corresponding operating carriers. Further, let F r be a subset of the J products, both pure online and virtual codeshare, that are o¤ered for sale by ticketing carrier r in the origin-destination market. 14 Carrier r solves the following pro…t maximization problem for each j 2 F r :
where q j = d j (p) in equilibrium, q j is the quantity of product j o¤ered for sale on the market, d j (p) is market demand for product j, p represents a J 1 vector of …nal prices, and z j is the e¤ective marginal cost that ticketing carrier r incurs by o¤ering product j for sale. In the event that product j is a codeshare product, then z j = w f j , where w f j is the price the ticketing carrier pays to operating carrier f for its transportation services. 15 On the other hand, if product j is a pure online product, then z j = c r j , where c r j is the marginal cost that carrier r incurs by using its own plane(s) to provide product j. Note that in the pure online product case f = r since carrier r is the sole ticketing and operating carrier of product j.
We posit that the marginal cost function is given by:
where W j is a vector of variables that shift marginal cost ("Itinerary Distance", "Carrier Presence at Origin", "Carrier Presence at Destination", market origin …xed e¤ects, and market destination …xed e¤ects) and is the associated vector of parameters, a f captures operating carrier-speci…c portion of marginal cost, and j is a mean-zero, random error term that captures unobserved determinants of marginal cost. When product j is pure online, implying that z j = c r j , then equation (7) simply relates a carrier's own marginal cost of providing a product to factors that in ‡uence this marginal cost. On the other hand, if product j is virtual codeshared, implying that z j = w f j , then equation (7) is saying that w f j depends on factors that in ‡uence the marginal cost of the carrier that provides operating services for the codeshare product. This is an implication of the assumed sequential price-setting game that determines equilibrium prices of codeshare products.
The reason is as follows. In the …rst stage of the sequential price-setting game, operating carriers each optimally choose w f j . Therefore, the equilibrium level of w f j in this …rst stage game depends on the marginal cost of the operating carrier that o¤ers transportation services for codeshare product j. So, like c r j , w f j is a function of factors that shift the marginal cost of the operating carrier. As such, the marginal cost function is e¤ectively:
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in …nal prices requires that p j of any product j o¤ered by carrier r must satisfy the …rst-order condition:
The …rst-order conditions are a set of J equations, one for each product. A few additional de…nitions allow for a more convenient representation of the …rst-order conditions using matrix notation. 16 First, let be a J J matrix which describes the ticketing carriers' ownership structure of the :
Second, let 4 be a J J matrix of …rst-order derivatives of product market shares with respect to …nal prices, where element 4 (j; k) = @d k @p j . In vector notation, the system of J …rst-order conditions for the ticketing carriers can now conveniently be expressed as:
where d( ), p, and z are J 1 vectors of product demands, …nal prices, and ticketing carriers' e¤ective marginal costs, respectively, while : means element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.
Equation (9) implies the following product markups: mkup ( ; ; ; ; ) = p z = ( : 4) 1 d(p);
which reveals that product markups are a function of demand parameters and the product ownership structure matrix.
In the event that the codeshare alliance allows Delta, Continental and Northwest to practice collusive pricing in markets where they codeshare together during the post-alliance period, then we can account for such collusive pricing behavior by appropriately modifying the product ownership 1 :
Therefore, under collusive alliance pricing the appropriate …rst-order conditions in markets where the three airlines codeshare together during the post-alliance period are:
where in equation (9) is replaced with Collude to obtain equation (11) . Product markups under collusive alliance pricing are:
Alternate Supply Equation Speci…cations
At this point we do not know whether the three alliance partners practice collusive pricing, which further implies that we do not know which product markup speci…cation, equation (10) versus equation (12) , is most appropriate to characterize pricing behavior. If the codeshare alliance does not allow Delta, Continental and Northwest to practice collusive pricing in the markets where they codeshare together during the post-alliance period, then the appropriate parametric supply equation speci…cation, which we de…ne as Model h, is given by:
where j is the structural supply error term, and the product markup variable, mkup j , is computed based on equation (10). On the other hand, if the codeshare alliance allows Delta, Continental and Northwest to practice collusive pricing in markets where they codeshare together during the post-alliance period, then the following parametric supply equation speci…cation, which we de…ne as Model g, should provide a better statistical …t of the data compared to Model h:
where the product markup variable, mkup Collude j , is computed based on equation (12) . 
Estimation
The parameters to be estimated are d = ( ; ; ; ) for demand and for marginal cost. Following Berry (1994) , the estimation strategy for demand parameters involves choosing parameter values such that observed product shares, S j , are equal to predicted product shares, s j , that is,
As previously stated in the data section, observed product shares are computed by S j = q j M . In the case where the predicted share function, s j ( ), is based on the nested logit model, the above estimation strategy yields the following well-known linear estimating equation:
ln (S j ) ln (S 0 ) = x j p j + ln S jjg + a r + mkt origin + mkt dest + 0 Codeshare_mkt
where S 0 is the observed share of the outside option, S jjg is the observed within group share of product j, and j is the structural demand error term. 17 Provided we have valid instruments for p j and S jjg , equation (16) is straightforward to estimate using a linear instrumental variables technique such as two-stage least squares (2SLS), which is the estimator we use. As previously discussed, we also instrument for variables associated with Codeshare_mkt using Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) to replace Codeshare_mkt, where 1 7 The observed share of the outside option is computed by S0 = 1
Sg, where Sg is computed by P Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) is computed from a previously estimated reduced-form logit model reported in Table 4 .
Supply Model h and Model g can be re-arranged as p j mkup j = W j h + a f + j and p j mkup Collude j = W j g +a f + j , where p j mkup j and p j mkup Collude j are e¤ectively the dependent variables for the supply regressions respectively. Once we use the estimated demand parameters to compute alternate product markups, mkup j and mkup Collude j , the dependent variables for the re-arranged supply equations can be constructed, and then marginal cost parameters, h and g , can be estimated consistently using ordinary least squares.
An alternate estimation strategy would be to estimate the demand and marginal cost parameters jointly. However, a crucial objective of the analysis is to …gure out what is the most appropriate speci…cation for the supply equation -Bertrand Nash versus collusive pricing by the partner carriers. In other words, the correct speci…cation of the supply equation is unclear a priori. 
Instruments
We recognize that a product's price and its within group share (p j and S jjg respectively) are likely to be correlated with the residual portion of the product's quality captured in j (where j is unobserved to the researchers but observed to passengers and airlines). As such, we need to …nd instruments for p j and S jjg in equation (16) . We make the well-known identifying assumption found in the literature on discrete choice models of demand that observed non-price product characteristics are uncorrelated with the residual portion of product quality left in j . 18 In other words, given that airline …xed e¤ect, market origin …xed e¤ects, and market destination …xed e¤ects are controlled for in the regression, then the residual shocks to product quality that are left in j are unlikely to be correlated with observed non-price product characteristics. This allows us to use various combinations of non-price product characteristics to form valid instruments for p j and S jjg .
The instruments we use include: (1) itinerary distance; (2) the number of competing products 1 8 For example, see Berry and Jia (2010) and Peters (2006) for similar identifying assumptions.
o¤ered by other airlines with equivalent number of intermediate stops;
(3) the number of competitor products in the market; (4) the number of other products o¤ered by an airline in a market; and (5) the sums and averages, by airlines in a market, of the "Inconvenient" and "Stops" variables. 19 As described in Gayle (2007a and 2013) , instruments (1) to (4) are motivated by supply theory, which predicts that the equilibrium price is a¤ected by changes in marginal cost and changes in product markup. For example, itinerary distance (instrument (1)) is a marginal cost-shifting variable, instruments (2) to (3) proxy for the degree of competition facing a product, which in turn a¤ects the size of a product's markup, and instrument (4) recognizes the fact that the more substitute products an airline o¤ers in a market, ceteris paribus, the airline is better able to charge a higher markup on each of these products. Last, instruments in (5) are likely to be correlated with reasons why passengers may prefer the set of products o¤ered by one airline over the set of products o¤ered by other airlines, and therefore serve as instruments for within group product shares.
Results
Demand Equation Estimates
Results from the demand estimation are reported in Table 5 . Estimation A in Table 5 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. OLS estimation ignores that price, within group product share, and variables associated with the Codeshare_mkt variable are likely endogenous, and therefore coe¢cient estimates associated with these variables are most likely biased. In fact, an immediate red ‡ag is that the OLS estimate of the coe¢cient on price is positive, which is contrary to standard demand theory.
Estimation B and Estimation C each uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) to account for suspected endogeneity. Estimation B only takes into account the suspected endogeneity of price and within group product share, while Estimation C takes into account all suspected endogenous variables. In Estimation C the predicted probability variable Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1), which is obtained from the previously estimated reduced-form logit model in Table 4 , is used to replace Hausman test in each case con…rms, at conventional levels of statistical signi…cance, that the variables suspected to be endogenous are indeed endogenous. 20 As such, the following discussion of results in Table 5 is based on Estimation C. to non-stop distance between the origin and destination cities, is supposed to capture aspects of itinerary convenience that are not picked up by number of intermediate stops. 21 We therefore expect the coe¢cient on "Inconvenient" to be negative, which is indeed the estimated sign in Table   5 .
2 0 In a …rst stage OLS regression in which price is the dependent variable and the instruments are the regressors, R 2 is 0.115. When the dependent variable of such a regression is within group product share, R 2 is 0.444. Recall from the data section that the Pseudo R 2 from the reduced-form Codeshare_mkt logit regression is 0.475, while the correlation between Codeshare_mkt and Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) is 0.717. Therefore, the instruments do have explanatory power of variations in the endogenous variables. 2 1 The minimum value that the "Inconvenient" variable can take on is 1. As such, the further an itinerary's "Inconvenient" measure is from 1, the less convenient is the itinerary. 
Estimation B versus Estimation C:
Hausman statistic = 97.52 Critical χ 2 (0.95, 5)= 11.07 Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Models are estimated with ticketing carrier dummies, market origin dummies and market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the table.
It has been argued that passengers are more likely to choose itineraries o¤ered by hub airlines for the following reasons: (1) ‡ight schedules o¤ered by hub airlines may be more convenient; and
(2) it is more likely that passengers have frequent- ‡yer membership with an airline that has a hub at the passenger's origin airport. 22 As described in the data section, a hub product means that the origin airport on the itinerary is a hub for the airline that o¤ers the product for sale. Consistent with our expectation, the coe¢cient on "Hub" is positive, suggesting that passengers are more likely to choose hub products, ceteris paribus.
As previously discussed in the data section, data on layover times and departure times, which are also measures of itinerary convenience, are not available in the DB1B database. Therefore, we cannot explicitly control for these aspects of itinerary convenience. However, it is reasonable to assume that the "Hub" dummy variable picks up some of these itinerary conveniences, which also explains the positive coe¢cient on this variable. Ito and Lee (2007) argue that passengers that are members of an airline's frequent- ‡yer program may view the airline's virtual codeshare product as an inferior substitute to its pure online product since virtual tickets often do not allow the frequent- ‡yer to upgrade to …rst class even though the ‡ights on the two itineraries (pure online and virtual) are the same. This argument leads us to expect the negative sign of the coe¢cient on the "Virtual" dummy variable in Table 5 . In other words, the negative sign suggests that passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as inferior substitutes to pure online products.
The estimate of is statistically greater than zero, but its value is closer to zero than one. As such, there is statistical (but weak economic) evidence that passengers perceive the set of products o¤ered by an airline as closer substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability of these products with products o¤ered by other airlines [Gayle (2007b) ]. In other words, passengers' choice behavior does have some element of airline brand-loyalty associated with it, even though this brand-loyalty does not seem to be very strong.
The estimate of 0 is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero, suggesting that demand for non-Delta/Continental/Northwest products is persistently/systematically lower across markets in which the three airlines eventually virtual codeshare together versus markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together. In contrast, the estimate of 1 is positive and statistically signi…cant, suggesting persistently higher demand for the three airlines' products across markets in which the three carriers eventually virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together. where Delta, Continental and Northwest compete but did not virtual codeshare together, demand did not change for products o¤ered by the three carriers over the pre and post-alliance periods.
Interestingly, we …nd that 5 < 0 and 6 > 0 at conventional levels of statistical signi…cance.
In addition, 5 6 = 0:49. Therefore, the sign pattern and actual values taken by 5 and 6 suggest that markets in which Delta, Continental and Northwest have a joint pre-alliance passenger share greater than 0:49 and eventually virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period, experience an increase in demand for the three carriers products over the pre and post-alliance periods. In other words, there is evidence of a demand-increasing e¤ect of virtual codesharing, but this demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that the partner carriers have a substantial joint pre-alliance passenger share. Interestingly, these are the type of markets that you would expect a relatively larger share of consumers to hold frequent- ‡yer membership with at least one of the carriers prior to implementation of the alliance. Therefore, this structural demand estimation result provides strong support for the argument that a key source of the demand-increasing e¤ect of codesharing is via the new opportunities that consumers have to accumulate and redeem frequent- ‡yer points across the partner carriers.
In an appendix available upon request we explore alternate and more detailed nesting structures for the demand model. We …nd that all qualitative results discussed above are robust to these alternate nesting structures.
Last, the demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -1.52. Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986), and Brander and Zhang (1990) argue that a reasonable range for own price elasticity in the airline industry is from -1. Table 6 reports summary statistics on price, computed product markups, and recovered marginal cost. 23 First, we see that during the post-alliance period mean price is lower in markets where the three partner carriers virtual codeshare together relative to markets in which they compete but do not codeshare together. Second, DL, CO and NW products have lower mean price relative to the mean price of products o¤ered by other airlines, and this relatively lower mean price is more pronounced in markets that the three partner carriers virtual codeshare together.
Computed Product Markups and Marginal Costs
Interestingly, product markups generated from the structural model reveal a di¤erent pattern than we see for price. In particular, even when assuming that the three partner carriers compete with each other in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together, the mean markup on their products ($157.15) is slightly higher (approximately 1 percent) relative to mean markup on products o¤ered by other airlines ($155.19) in these markets. Therefore, the higher mean price of products o¤ered by other airlines in these markets is likely due to cost factors, as evidenced by recovered marginal cost in the last column of the table. If we assume that DL, CO and NW collude in markets that they virtual codeshare together, the comparative patterns on mean markups and mean marginal cost described above are more pronounced in these markets. In particular, mean markup on products o¤ered by the three partner carriers ($165.91) is substantially higher than mean markup on products o¤ered by other carriers ($155. 19) , and mean marginal cost across products o¤ered by the three carriers ($44. 15) is substantially lower than mean marginal cost across products o¤ered by other carriers ($60.68 ).
The 
Results from Supply Equation Estimation
Note that the markets in which price-setting behavior is in question are markets in which DL, CO and NW virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period. This is because the policyrelevant issue is whether virtual codesharing together facilitates collusive price-setting behavior between the partner carriers. As such, the remainder of the analysis focuses on this subsample of markets. Therefore, the supply equations are estimated on this subsample of markets. The coe¢cient estimate on "Itinerary Distance" in each supply model is positive and statistically signi…cant. This is evidence that marginal cost is increasing in itinerary distance, as we expect.
As previously described in the data section, both the "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier Presence at Destination" variables are airline-speci…c and vary across markets for each airline.
"Carrier Presence at Origin" measures the number of di¤erent cities that an airline has non-stop ‡ights from going into the origin city of the market, while "Carrier Presence at Destination" measures the number of di¤erent cities that the airline serves using non-stop ‡ights from the destination city of the market. These variables should be correlated with the volume of passengers an airline channels through a market even though the endpoint cities of the market may not be the origin or …nal destination for many of the passengers. As such, we use these variables to indirectly capture the presence of economies of passenger-tra¢c density. Economies of passenger-tra¢c density means that an airline's marginal cost of transporting a passenger in a market falls as the volume of passengers that the airline transports in the market increases [Brueckner and Spiller (1994) ].
An anonymous referee correctly points out that since the coe¢cients on the carrier-presence variables measure an airport-level e¤ect on a carrier's prices in individual markets, perhaps these coe¢cients capture some blend of economies of density along with the cost of running a hub. As such, when drawing economic inferences from the sign of these coe¢cient estimates, it is advisable to remember that economies of density might not be the only factor that in ‡uences these coe¢cient estimates.
The coe¢cient estimate on "Carrier Presence at Origin" is positive and statistically signi…- Model g. The coe¢cient estimates on "Carrier Presence at Destination" and "(Carrier Presence at Destination) 2 " in Model h suggest that an airline has to provide nonstop ‡ight to at least 133 di¤erent cities ( 0:008 2 (0:00003) ) from the destination city in order to achieve economies of passenger-tra¢c density in the relevant market. This "presence" threshold is not widely attained in the sample given that the maximum value for the "Carrier Presence at Destination" variable is 143, with a mean of 26. However, since economies of passenger-tra¢c density might not be the only factor driving these coe¢cient estimates, then these coe¢cient estimates might not yield a precise "presence" threshold estimate for achieving economies of passenger-tra¢c density. Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. a indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficients on the markup variables, mkup and mkup Collude , are not estimated but set equal to 1 based on theoretical derivations of the supply equations in the model section. Models are estimated with operating carrier dummies, market origin dummies and market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the table
Statistical Non-nested Tests for Model Selection
To determine which of the two alternate supply model speci…cations provides the best statistical …t of the data, we rely on a likelihood-based non-nested statistical test in Vuong (1989) . 24 The non-nested statistical test is a modi…cation of the well-known likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio statistic for comparing Model h and Model g is given by:
where j index observations in the data, and n is the sample size. LL h j is the optimal value of the log likelihood function for Model h evaluated at observation j. Speci…cally, assuming that the error term of the supply equation is normally distributed, LL h j = log
the standard normal probability density function, b h is the vector of marginal cost parameter estimates for Model h that we report in Table 7 , and b h is an estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals from Model h. 25 LL g j is computed analogously, i.e. LL g j = log
where b g is the vector of marginal cost parameter estimates for Model g that we report in Table 7 , and b g is an estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals from Model g. Vuong (1989) shows that the likelihood ratio statistic in (17) can be normalized by its variance: 
Furthermore, the resulting non-nested test statistic:
is asymptotically distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis that the two models being compared by the test are asymptotically equivalent. 26 As such, for this one-tale test at a 5% level of signi…cance, Q > 1:64 implies that supply model g is statistically rejected in favor of supply model h, Q < 1:64 implies that supply model h is statistically rejected in favor of supply model g, while 1:64 < Q < 1:64 implies that we cannot statistically distinguish between the two models being compared.
For the estimated supply models in Table 7 , we …nd that Q = 5:27, suggesting that model g is statistically rejected in favor of supply model h. In other words, the supply model that assumes the three carriers do not collude (Model h) in their codeshare markets during the post-alliance period is statistically superior to the supply model that assumes the three airlines collude (Model g) in these markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to explicitly test and statistically reject that collusive pricing behavior is associated with a codeshare alliance.
Unlike international alliance partners that often receive antitrust immunity, i.e. antitrust authorities have granted some international partners the right to explicitly collude, domestic alliance partnerships have not been granted such rights [see Brueckner and Proost (2010); Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2011); and Brueckner (2003) ]. However, even though domestic alliance partners are forbidden to explicitly collude, it is reasonable to suspect, as policymakers did in the case of the DL/CO/NW alliance, that the cooperation between domestic partners required to make their interline service seamless, could facilitate illegal tacit collusion. So prior to the formal analysis in this paper, tacit collusion between domestic partners could not be ruled out.
Conclusion
The main contribution of our present paper is to specify and estimate a structural econometric model that allows us to disentangle demand changes from possible changes in airline pricing behavior that are associated with a codeshare alliance. We focus on the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance, which was formed in June 2003. This alliance is particularly interesting to study because, before ultimately allowing the alliance to go forward, the U.S. Department of Transportation expressed concern that the alliance could facilitate collusion on prices and/or service levels in the partners' overlapping markets. In addition, previous reduced-form econometric analysis of this alliance found evidence that virtual codesharing between Delta, Continental and Northwest is associated with higher price [see Gayle (2008) ]. Therefore, our analysis focuses on better understanding the market e¤ects, both from the demand and supply sides of the market, of virtual codesharing between the three airlines in their overlapping markets.
Our key …ndings are as follows: First, the econometric estimates for the air travel demand equation suggest that the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance has a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. Importantly, the demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that the partners have a substantial joint passenger share (greater than 49%) prior to implementation of the alliance. Since a relatively larger proportion of passengers in a market are more likely to have frequent- ‡yer membership with at least one of the three carriers in markets that the carriers jointly dominate prior to the alliance, this …nding is consistent with the argument that these frequent- ‡yer passengers will increase their demand for the alliance partners' products given that the alliance creates new opportunities for passengers to accumulate and redeem frequent- ‡yer points across partner carriers.
In summary, if increased collusive pricing behavior of the partner carriers is the primary concern of policymakers with allowing the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance to go forward, then the evidence does not suggest implementation of the alliance facilitated collusive pricing.
